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ABSTRACT
Unions are held responsible for various wage effects, such as higher wages and w age
compression. In this paper we investigate another possible union effect on w ages: are 
the actions of unions responsible for the observed relation betw een required education 
and w ages? It is w ell know n that wages are related to education, and there is also strong 
evidence that working in a job requiring a level of education below one's own level has a 
negative effect on wages. These effects are usually ascribed to productivity differences, 
but recent research indicates that at least some of these effects may be nonproductivity-
related. In this paper we examine the extent to w hich relative wage levels of recent 
Dutch labour market entrants, and of workers in jobs requiring their own level compared 
to a lower level, are influenced by the institutional arrangements specified in collective 
bargaining agreements. In particular, we look at differences in the pattern of wages of 
those working under a bargaining agreement without a job evaluation system compared 
to those w orking under agreements containing clauses specifying a job evaluation 
system, the latter being further subdivided into systems excluding and systems allowing 
w age variability based on individual performance. In line with our expectations, we find 
that job evaluation systems w ithout flexible components compress w age differences 
relative to the w ages under collective agreements w ithout job evaluation systems.  
Contrary to our expectations, flexible components in collective agreements do not 
decompress w age structures. In fact the opposite appears to be true: the w age 
differences between education levels are smallest for this group. Finally, in line with our 
expectations, in highly standardized systems (job evaluation systems without flexible 
components) wage penalties are lowest, and increase for higher educated w orkers w hen 
flexibility is introduced. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The strong relation between education and labour market outcomes is often explained in 
terms of human capital theory (Becker 1964, Schultz 1963), which claims that people 
w ith more years of schooling earn more because the competencies they acquired in 
education have made them more productive. There is also a growing body of research 
emphasizing the idea that productivity not only depends on characteristics of workers, 
but also on the nature of the jobs they perform. A poor fit between the educational level 
of a worker and that required in his/her job is seen as an important determinant of the 
w age differential observed in the labour market between comparable w orkers 
(Sicherman 1991, Alba-Ramirez 1993, Cohn and Khan 1995, Kiker et al. 1997; Cohn 
and Ng 2000, Ng 2001, Bauer 2002). Workers in jobs requiring a low er level of 
education than their ow n (overeducated w orkers) are penalised in terms of w ages 
compared to similarly educated w orkers w orking in jobs that match their education 
(adequately educated workers). These findings have usually been justified by means of 
the assignment theory (Sattinger 1993), w hich predicts that productivity, and thus 
w ages, depend on the match between actual and required education. The reasoning is 
that low er level jobs are thought to give w orkers less opportunity to utilize their 
competencies than jobs at the appropriate level.
Although w age effects of both w orkers’ education and the educational 
requirements of their jobs is well established, recent analyses have cast doubt on the 
extent to which these wage effects can be accounted for by individual productivity. For 
example, scholars such as Spence (1973) and Arrow (1973) have pointed out that pay is 
often based directly on formal education as a proxy or signal of expected productivity 
rather than on actual productivity at the level of individual w orkers. Further, recent 
research by Allen and Van der Velden (2001), Green and McIntosh (2002) and Di Prieto 
and Urw in (2006) did not find empirical support for the assumption of assignment theory 
that w age penalties associated w ith over-education are actually due to diminished 
utilisation of competencies. 
To the extent that w age effects of education and over-education are at least 
linked to expected productivity, the implications for workers may be relatively modest. 
Signalling effects are usually explained in terms of incomplete information and bounded 
rationality, and as such should diminish over time as employers accumulate more 
accurate information on the actual performance of individual workers. However, scholars 
such as Collins (1979) and Bills (2003) have cast doubt on w hether wage effects of 
education are related to productivity at all, w hether at the level of individuals or of 
groups. Collins asserts that workers engage in political as well as productive labour, and 
points to the importance of credentials such as formal education as a kind of entry ticket 
to the most privileged positions. They refer implicitly to institutional effects on wages. 
The institutional dimension of w age formation has been extensively explored by scholars 
of industrial relations.
Industrial relations research has found that unions reduce wage inequality within 
unionized sectors. This effect is attributed to unions’ policy to promote standard rates 
and thereby create greater uniformity within and across firms (Reynolds and Taft 1956, 
Freeman 1980, 1982, Lemieux 1998). Unions favour standard rates and seniority based 
progression in order to prevent subjective judgement on the basis of personal 
characteristics (Freeman 1980, 1982). This compresses w age structure and w ould 
favour less skilled w orkers relative to their more skilled counterparts. Thus, unions’ 
policy to standardize w ages disconnects pay from actual productivity. How ever, the 
effects found may be due to (self-)selection rather than to policies of unions per se 
(Kahn 2000, Card et al. 2007.): unions jobs are less attractive for highly skilled workers 
than non-unions jobs, since their higher productivity due to unobserved skills (i.e. not 
measured in terms of educational level) is not rewarded in terms of higher w ages. 
Therefore, highly educated workers with high unobserved skills have more to gain in a 
competitive non-union labour market, w hereas the highly educated w orkers with low 
unobserved skills will be more inclined to accept a union job. This selection effect or 
unobserved heterogeneity-effect may be an alternative explanation for the observed 
flattening effect in unionized sectors. 
Research on the effects of institutional factors simply uses union coverage as a predictor 
for w age fixation. How ever, such an indicator can not distinguish flattening effects 
result ing from explicit union policies from selection. In order to make such a distinction, 
w e need to examine the actual clauses of collective agreements, in particular the
different levels of w age rate standardization that are specified. If w age levels are 
influenced by union policies, we should observe strong differences in w age patterns 
across these different collective agreement clauses. We expect that a w age 
compression effect of collective agreement clauses that standardize w age rates 
(proposition I). When standardization of wages in collective agreements is based on 
education as an objective indicator for productivity, w e expect w age penalties to 
decrease: equally educated school leavers will be more equally paid (proposition II). 
DATA AND METHODS
We examined the relation between institutional arrangements and their effects on wage 
effects on over-education by comparing the wages of school leavers that are governed 
by different collective bargaining arrangements. Although the unionization rate is less 
than 25% in the Netherlands, 82% of employees are covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement. This high coverage of employees along with a relatively low unionization rate 
is primarily caused by the extension of collective agreement clauses to all workers in the 
sector by the Minister of Social Affairs. Collective agreements predominantly determine 
individual labor contracts and set the minimum wage levels by wage-scales. In traditional 
collective agreements (that is without a job evaluation system) employees’ position in 
these scales are determined by the job title and years of experience. Job evaluation 
systems link wages to the tasks and responsibilities of the job. Variable components in 
these evaluations systems give the opportunity to relate wage levels or wage increases 
to individual performances. This option has become more common in collective 
agreements reached in the last two decades (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 
2006). 
For information on the existence and nature of job evaluation systems, we made 
use of the so-called Ducadam data-set.1 This data-set contains all collective agreements 
signed by the largest Dutch labor union FNV, which make up approximately 92% of the 
population of Dutch collective agreements. This dataset contains a large set of indicators 
on various aspects of over 5000 collective agreements that were effective between 1995 
and 2007. This dataset contained two variables that provide information on the presence 
of a job evaluation system and whether this system includes an individual variable wage 
component. Both variables are dichotomized variables. For examining whether collective 
bargaining agreements fix wages, we matched the Ducadam data-set to the SIS school-
leaver data-set of the Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA). 
Since the early 1990s, ROA has conducted annual surveys of recent school- leavers at 
secondary and tertiary education. Since the late 1990s these surveys are representative 
for the population of school-leavers in the school year prior to the survey. They are 
strongly focused on the labor market position that school- leavers have attained some 1-
2 years after entering the labor market. For this study we make use of data on school-
leavers who participated in the survey in the period 1996 through 2007. We selected 
those school-leavers who were working in an economic sector that was covered by a 
sector-level collective bargaining agreement as specified in the Ducadam database. To 
achieve an optimum degree of comparability, w e restricted the analyses to those 
w orking in jobs requiring precisely one’s own level of education and those working in 
                                                  
1  The DUCADAM data-set made available through the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies.
jobs requiring the level directly below one’s own level. Those working in jobs above, or 
more than one level below, their own level have been excluded. In total some 21,659 
school-leavers were retained for analysis, of which 18% had graduated from secondary 
vocation education (in Dutch: middelbaar beroepsonderwijs or MBO), 49% from higher 
vocational education (in Dutch: hoger beroepsonderwijs or HBO), and the remaining 
33% from academic universities.
The data from the tw o data-sets has been linked via the economic sector code 
and year. In the Ducadam dataset year w as identified as the year in w hich the 
agreement w as reached, while in the SIS data it was the year of the survey. If there was 
no collective bargaining agreement in a sector in the survey year, the data of the most 
recent collective bargaining agreement – w hich w as then still in effect – w as used. In this 
w ay all school-leavers in a given sector are assigned all of the collective bargaining 
characteristics that applied in their sector in the year of the survey.
For the analyses we use a 3-level hierarchical loglinear regression model in 
w hich individual workers are nested within collective bargaining agreement years, which 
are in turn nested within collective bargaining agreements. The dependent variable is 
(the natural logarithm of) inflation-corrected hourly wages. Education and over-education 
are indicated by a series of dummies indicating the combination of worker’s level of 
education and the level of the job in which he/she is working (with the largest category, 
HBO graduates working at HBO level being the reference category). An additional two 
dummies indicate respectively the existence of a job evaluation system without and with 
variable wage clauses, with no job evaluation system being the reference category. To 
indicate differential effects of education and over-education in sectors governed by the 
different institutional arrangements, the interactions between the education/over-
education dummies and the institutional dummies have been included. Finally, w e 
included four control variables, one at the level of agreement year (the year of the 
agreement, counting from 1995), and three at the individual level (gender, age and years 
elapsed since the agreement was reached).
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the results of the multilevel analyses of the effects of different collective 
agreements clauses on the w ages of school leavers. The importance of collective 
agreement level factors is shown by the results of model 0. This model, which includes 
no explanatory variables, shows the degree to which collective agreement level factors 
and agreement year level and individual level factors respectively are responsible for the 
variance in w ages of school leavers. As can be expected, most variance (around two 
thirds) is accounted for by individual differences between school leavers. Differences at 
the level of collective agreements account for about 30% of the differences in wages, 
w hile the remaining 3% of variance is at the level of agreement years. 
Model 1 investigates the relationship betw een education and job level, by 
introducing dummies indicating the combination of worker’s level of education and the 
level of the job in which he/she is working. HBO educated workers in HBO-level jobs 
form the reference group. The parameters of these dummies are highly significant and 
show a plausible sequence of wage differences: higher educated school leavers working 
at the appropriate job level earn more their counterparts in lower level jobs, and higher 
educated school leavers earn higher wages than lower educated. Model 1 also includes
four control variables, one at the level of agreement year (the year of the agreement, 
counting from 1995), and three at the individual level (gender, age and years elapsed 
since the agreement was reached). The parameters of the control variables in model 2 
are all significant (p < 0.1). Women earn less than men and older school leavers earn 
more than younger ones. In addition, employees covered by a later version of a contract 
and those started in subsequent years of the same contract earn more, reflecting 
collective, structural w age increases. The introduction of the education and control 
variables reduced the variance by around 50%, which improved the model significantly 
(p < 0.1). This reduction results predominantly from a reduction at the collective 
agreement level. 
Table 1 Effect of overeducation by level of collective agreement clauses
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
  PARAMETER   B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E.
University educated
- university-level job 0.145 0.005 0.145 0.005 0.118 0.030
- HBO-level job 0.084 0.009 0.084 0.009 0.026 0.030
HBO educated
- HBO-level job (ref.)
- MBO-level job -0.099 0.006 -0.099 0.006 -0.169 0.018
MBO-educated
- MBO-level job -0.289 0.007 -0.289 0.007 -0.393 0.017
- lower secondary-level job -0.387 0.011 -0.387 0.011 -0.497 0.020
Gender (female) -0.040 0.005 -0.040 0.005 -0.039 0.005
Age 0.020 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.020 0.000
Agreement year (1995=0) 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
Years since agreement 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.002
Job rating system (ref. no JRS)
- without flexible wages 0.023 0.021 -0.058 0.024
- with flexible wages 0.005 0.024 -0.036 0.029
Interaction non-flexible job rating system
X University educated
- university-level job 0.038 0.030
- HBO-level job 0.073 0.032
X HBO educated
- MBO-level job 0.081 0.019
X MBO-educated
- MBO-level job 0.119 0.019
- lower secondary-level job 0.139 0.025
Interaction flexible job rating system
X University educated
- university-level job -0.052 0.035
- HBO-level job -0.025 0.039
X HBO educated
- MBO-level job 0.021 0.029
X MBO-educated
- MBO-level job 0.101 0.026
- lower secondary-level job 0.184 0.058
Constant 2.346 0.029 1.968 0.021 1.956 0.023 2.028 0.025
Variance components
- bargaining agreement level 0.0485 0.0096 0.0102 0.0023 0.0095 0.0022 0.0090 0.0021
- agreement year level 0.0051 0.0010 0.0021 0.0005 0.0022 0.0005 0.0022 0.0005
- individual level 0.1089 0.0011 0.0716 0.0007 0.0716 0.0007 0.0713 0.0007
Model fit 0.1625 13854.4 4651.9 4650.7 4560.6
Change in model fit 9202.5 1.2 90.1
Underline = significant at 5%; Bold = significant at 1%
Model 2 introduces the main effects of job evaluation systems. The parameters of the 
variables indicating the presence of a job evaluation system are not significant. More 
interesting are the interactions in model 3 between job evaluation systems on one hand 
and education and job level on the other. With the exception of university graduates 
w orking at their own level, the parameters of the dummies for job evaluation systems 
w ithout flexible components are all positive and significant and indicate an improvement 
in the wage position of workers in the categories mentioned, relative to HBO graduates 
w orking in a HBO job. The coefficients are highest for the lower level workers and jobs, 
suggesting a relative improvement in wage levels for MBO school-leavers, and for those 
w orking below  their level relative to this w orking at their ow n level. How ever, it is 
somew hat misleading to focus on only these coefficients, since the main effects of both 
the education-job level dummies and the job rating system dummies have also changed. 
We w ill return to this below . The parameters for the dummies for interaction effects of 
the flexible wage clauses with education/job level matches are only significant for MBO-
school-leavers. Again, the results indicate an improvement in the wage position of these 
school-leavers relative to their higher-education counterparts, and a decrease in the 
w age penalty for MBO school leavers w orking in lower level jobs. But again, it is 
misleading to look at only these results in isolation from the changed parameters for the 
main effects. It can be remarked that the model fit has improved significantly with the 
addition of these interaction effects.
In order to gain a clearer picture of the net effects of job rating systems on 
w ages, we have calculated the estimated w ages for each of the education- job level 
categories under the three different arrangements. Figure 1 shows these estimates in 
terms of hourly wage in Euro’s. It shows that flexible wage components increase wages 
for the lower level educated, while they reduce wage for the higher educated school 
leavers. They reduce the effects of education of university level educated school leavers 
w orking in HBO level jobs, and increase the effect of education for lower level education 
(MBO).
Figure 1: estimated hourly wages by collective agreement clause
Compared to collective bargaining agreements without an explicit job rating system, 
university and HBO graduates working in jobs requiring their own level of education earn 
somew hat less per hour when they are subject to a job rating system without wage 
flexibility. In contrast, the wage position of MBO school-leavers working at their own level 
improves slightly when such arrangements are in place. The wage position of all three 
levels of school leavers working below their own level is somewhat better when a non-
flexible rating system is in place. The improvement is most pronounced for MBO-school-
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leavers, suggesting that these w orkers also see an improvement compared to their 
higher educated counterparts. However, because of the opposing effects for university 
and HBO graduates working at their own level and those working below their own level, 
the w age penalty for over-education is diminished for these categories.
The tendency to decrease overall wage differences is even more pronounced 
under job-rating systems with wage flexibility. Especially university graduates – both 
those working at their own level and those working at HBO level – earn markedly less 
under such arrangements. In contrast, HBO graduates working at their own level and 
both categories of MBO school leavers do somewhat better when the job rating system 
contains clauses allowing wage flexibility (although the HBO graduates still do slightly 
w orse than when there is no job rating system at all). Of those working below their own 
level, it is again the MBO school-leavers who benefit most from flexibility clauses, to the 
extent that there is hardly any difference any more between those w orking at and those 
w orking below  their ow n level. In contrast, university and HBO graduates working below 
their own level are somewhat worse off under more flexible arrangements. In the case of 
HBO graduates, this increases the difference betw een those w orking at and those 
w orking below  their ow n level. In the case of university graduates, the difference remains 
about the same, but interestingly, the difference between university graduates and HBO 
graduates working in HBO jobs all but disappears. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we distinguished tw o effects of collective agreement clauses on wages. 
The first effect is the w age compression effect of standardization of wages (proposition 
I). Collective agreements with job evaluation systems but without flexible components 
seem to increase the link between education and w ages. This suggests that job 
evaluation systems imply further standardization of w ages on the basis of education, as 
an objective indicator. This further standardization of wages by job evaluation systems 
indeed compresses wage differences relative to the wages under collective agreements 
w ithout job evaluation systems, comparable w ith findings in research on the effect 
betw een union and non-union sectors. Although we expected that f lexible components in 
collective agreements w ould decompress wage structures, the opposite appears to be 
true: the less flexible systems (no job evaluation systems and job evaluation systems 
w ithout flexible components) show larger wage differences between University level and 
MBO educated employees. This particular finding creates a puzzle that calls for further 
theoretical investigation. Finally, the flattening effect of flexible components on wages 
appears to be to the advantage of lower educated and to the disadvantage of higher 
educated school leavers.
The second effect we expected was that institutional rigidity based on education 
reduces wage penalties of over-education (proposition II). We found that w age penalties 
of over-education in systems for flexible systems shrink for the lower education MBO 
school leavers, while they first decrease less for higher educated w orkers. In fact, in 
highly standardized systems (job evaluation systems without flexible components) wage 
penalties are low est, and increase for higher educated w orkers w hen flexibility is 
introduced. This finding is line with proposition II.
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